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Preface
American Constitutional Law is a sprawling subject. Some law schools cover the topic
in one course, others in two or three; some cover it in the first year, others only in the
second and third years, and still others teach some of it in the first year and then more in
the final two years. The subject is so large that most law schools also teach pieces of it in
classes principally focused on Administrative Law, Criminal Procedure, Civil Procedure,
Property, and many other topics.
American legal publishers have produced scores of casebooks to fit this range of
approaches. It was thus with some trepidation that we decided to add our book to the mix.
In the end, we concluded that we had a contribution to make, even to this rich market.
There is, of course, something like a “canon” in constitutional law, which means that a
book is unlikely to be distinctive for the cases that it chooses to cover; a constitutional
law casebook would not be particularly useful, for example, if it did not include Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819), Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954), or many others.
Instead, we think our book is distinctive—and thus will be especially effective in teaching
the subject—for four principal reasons.
First, the book comes with an electronic version that students can access on their
computers. The electronic version contains live hyperlinks to cases, statutes, law review
articles, and other materials available on Westlaw and other websites. Accordingly, students who wish to explore the material in greater depth have the tools at their fingertips
to do so. In addition, students who use laptop computers in the classroom will be able to
view the course materials on their computers in class.
Second, we have selected the principal cases very carefully, and we have tried to avoid
the problem created by the aggressive editing in many books, which present excerpts so
brief that the students in effect read only about what the Supreme Court has decided. But
Supreme Court opinions should be presented as more than a series of conclusory assertions that have been stitched together by a space-sensitive editor. We have tried to edit
the principal cases to ensure that they are short enough to read, but rich enough to give
the students a clear sense of the Court’s reasoning. We have also chosen not to create the
illusion of breadth that characterizes many books in the field. Rather than provide summaries of dozens of decisions in each area that we take up, we focus on fuller excerpts of
the principal cases, which are designed to be illustrative. Our book is self-consciously a
casebook, and does not aspire to be a treatise.
Third, rather than follow the principal cases with pages and pages of notes and questions—an ineffective approach that students universally resent—we include multiple
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sidebars in the excerpts of each principal case to focus the students’ attention on important
questions at the very moment when they are reading the relevant portions of the opinion.
Among other things, the sidebars focus attention on particularly salient passages of the
opinions; draw connections between the discussion in the case and other topics that the
students have explored (or will explore) in the book; supply food for thought; and direct
the students to secondary materials to enrich their studies. After each case, we provide
brief points for discussion, to focus the students’ attention on the central themes in the
case. Each Chapter also contains hypothetical problems—often drawn from real cases—to
encourage the students to apply the doctrine that they have learned, and ends with an
“executive summary” of the material, to identify the main themes and doctrines covered
in the Chapter.
Fourth, throughout the book we include “Point-Counterpoints,” in which we provide
arguments for and against central questions raised by the materials in the book. To be sure,
throughout the book—in the points for discussion and in short excerpts from scholarly
articles by leading experts in the field—we present a diversity of views on every subject.
But the Point-Counterpoint discussions are presented in our own voices and reflect our
genuine points of disagreement on the many disputed questions raised in the book. We
think that the students will find these discussions rich and stimulating.
The first edition of the book covered decisions through the Supreme Court’s October
2007 term, which ended in June 2008. The second edition expands the excerpts of many
of the cases and includes cases decided since 2008. The principal cases range from the
old chestnuts to significant cases of much more recent vintage; from (to take just a few
examples) Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), to McDonald v. City of Chicago,
130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010); from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 ( 1952),
to Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); from Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857),
to Parents Involved in Comm. Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
In addition, Part I, which provides background and an overview, ends with District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the recent Second Amendment decision, as an
illustrative case to foreshadow the themes that will recur in the rest of the book.
Although we have attempted to provide fuller excerpts of the principal cases than
is perhaps common in casebooks in the field, we of course nevertheless have had to do
substantial editing. We have used three asterisks to indicate that text has been omitted
within a paragraph, although we have often omitted entire paragraphs without providing
a similar indication. (Because the cases are hyperlinked, students can easily read the full
opinions, if they so choose.) We have omitted most footnotes from the cases; when we
have included them, we have used the original numbering from the cases. Footnotes
that we have inserted in the cases, on the other hand, are indicated by an asterisk and
conclude with the notation “—Eds.” We have also omitted many of the citations, but we
have attempted to preserve the most important ones, which are also hyperlinked for the
convenience of the students.
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We wish to acknowledge the many people who have helped us to produce this book.
Many people helped us with the first edition. Our colleagues Tom Colby, Chip Lupu,
and Robert Tuttle gave helpful suggestions, both for organization and content. Jonathan
Affleck, Julia Carrano, Bob Chen, Courtney Enlow, and Brad Sauer went above and beyond
as research assistants, editing cases and offering insightful commentary. Holly Saari did
a terrific job making a dry manuscript come alive on the page. Louis Higgins graciously
invited us to write the book and provided constant guidance and aid in seeing it through
to completion. Dean Fred Lawrence and the George Washington University Law School
also offered generous support.
We have had a similar embarrassment of riches with the second edition. Brad Clark,
Tom Colby, Chip Lupu, Jeff Powell, and David Stras gave us invaluable feedback on the
first edition (which they were kind enough to use in their classes). James Brower, Jamie
Goldman, Elizabeth Gray, Ann Hodulik, Brittany Honeyman, Lindsay Lane, Richard Martinelli, Kyle Noonan, and Corrina Sowden provided outstanding research assistance. And
Megan Anderson and Holly Saari again transformed our messy mass of edits into a clean
and attractive book.
Gregory Maggs dedicates his contributions to the book to his patient family and to the
many generations of law students at the George Washington University who have contributed to his understanding of constitutional law. Peter Smith dedicates his contributions
to the book to Eileen and David Smith and Laurie Sparling, who have always provided
unconditional love and support, and to Jonah and Sarah, whose already highly refined
sense of justice has consistently challenged his own.
We hope that reading this book is as enjoyable for you as writing it was for us.

GREGORY E. MAGGS
PETER J. SMITH

March 2011
Washington, DC
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P ART I: I NTRODUCTION

C HAPTER 1

History and Overview
This book concerns the constitutional law of the United States. As you will see in
reading it, the book focuses mostly on how the Supreme Court has interpreted various
provisions of the U.S. Constitution. This introductory chapter provides some background
for understanding the Court’s cases. The chapter starts by describing the historical setting
in which the Constitution came into being. It then briefly outlines the structure and content of the Constitution. Finally, it presents conflicting theories about how courts should
interpret the Constitution.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

A. Historical Setting of the
Constitution
In the mid-1700s, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain1 possessed a number of colonies
in North America. Thirteen of these colonies
later declared their independence and joined
together to form the United States of America:
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,

Go Online
Many law students feel that they
would benefit from a quick refresher
on American history. For a concise
and easily accessible survey, visit
the U.S. State Department’s “Outline
of U.S. History,” available at http://
infousa.state.gov/government/overview/docs/historytln.pdf. Chapters
3 and 4 of this outline, titled “The
Road to Independence” and “The
Formation of a National Government,” are especially relevant.

1
“Great Britain” is the name of the large island that England, Scotland, and Wales occupy. The Kingdom of
England annexed Wales through Acts of Parliament passed in 1536 and 1543. In 1707, the Act of Union merged
the Kingdom of England and the Kingdom of Scotland to form a new nation called the “United Kingdom of Great
Britain.” Historical discussions often shorten the lengthy name of this nation to the “United Kingdom” or “Great
Britain” or just “Britain.”
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Rhode Island, South Carolina and Virginia.2
What led these colonies to seek independence? What did they hope to accomplish in
forming a new nation? How did they organize their government? These are questions that
anyone studying the Constitution must consider.

1. Colonial Governance and Events Preceding the Revolution
The thirteen colonies that later formed the United States exercised a fair degree of
self-governance for many years. Each of the colonies had an elected assembly or legislature, which had authority to pass laws. In addition, these assemblies generally had the sole
power to impose taxes and the sole authority to set the budget. The assemblies’ enactments
were subject to disapproval by a governor (who was appointed by the King of England in
all of the colonies except Connecticut and Rhode Island) and by an appointed legislative
council (except in Pennsylvania). But actual disapproval of legislation was very rare, and
until the mid-1700s, few disputes arose between the colonies and the King or Parliament.
Serious challenges to the colonies’ self-governance did not come about until the end of
the French and Indian War. In this conflict, which lasted from 1754 until 1763, the United
Kingdom fought against France and France’s American Indian allies in North America.
Although the United Kingdom ultimately prevailed, it incurred enormous expenses in the
process. To help recover some of that money, Parliament passed several acts that sought to
raise revenue from the colonies. These acts included the Stamp Act of 1765 and Townshend Act of 1767, both of which imposed taxes on various goods within the colonies.
Many colonists believed that these acts exceeded the power of Parliament. They
asserted that any taxation imposed on the colonists must come from their own assemblies.
Some of the colonists consequently protested the legislation with petitions and civil disobedience. In 1770, to alleviate tensions, Parliament repealed the taxes on almost all goods.
But Parliament retained a tax on tea, largely to demonstrate that it did have power to tax
the colonies if it so chose.
Colonists responded to the remaining tax by boycotting British tea and by smuggling
tea into the country without paying taxes on it. (John Hancock, who later played a key
role in the formation of the United States, was indicted on criminal charges for illegally
purchasing and reselling tea from Holland.) Parliament in turn passed the Tea Act of 1773,
which allowed the English East India Company to import and sell tea at lower prices than
what the colonial merchants were charging, with the hope of inducing Americans to stop
their boycott of British tea. To thwart this measure, on December 16, 1773, a group called
the Sons of Liberty boarded ships in Boston Harbor that were carrying East India Company
tea and threw the tea into the water.
2
In North America, the United Kingdom also possessed the colonies of Quebec, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward
Island, East Florida, and West Florida, but these colonies did not seek independence at the time of the American
Revolution. Prior to the Revolution, the territory that later became Vermont was not recognized as a separate
colony; instead, it was claimed by the colonies of both New York and New Hampshire. Vermont declared its
independence from Great Britain and from New York and New Hampshire in 1777, but did not participate in the
government formed by the Articles of Confederation. It joined the United States, after ratification of the Constitution, in 1791. Massachusetts assumed control over Maine in the mid-1600s and retained that control until 1820.
Maine accordingly did not sign the Declaration of Independence.

Chapter 1 History and Overview

In 1774, in response to this famous “Boston Tea Party,” Parliament passed five laws that
the colonists called the “Intolerable Acts” or
the “Coercive Acts.” These acts, among other
things, severely limited the civil and political
rights of colonists in Massachusetts. The goal
was to force the colonists to make restitution
for the tea and generally cease their defiance of
Parliament. The founders of the United States
remembered the loss of their liberty when they
later drafted the Constitution and Bill of Rights.

2. The First and Second Continental
Congresses
The Intolerable Acts and other factors led
concerned colonists from all of the colonies
except Georgia to send delegates to a meeting
in Philadelphia. The meeting became known
as the “First Continental Congress.” The delegates met peacefully between September 5
and October 26, 1774. In total, fifty delegates
attended. They included many famous figures
of the era, such as John Adams, Samuel Adams,
Patrick Henry, John Jay, Richard Henry Lee,
Peyton Randolph, Roger Sherman, and George
Washington.

3

FYI
The Intolerable Acts consisted of
five individual acts. The Boston
Port Act closed Boston to commercial shipping. The Quartering Act
allowed a governor to order that
British soldiers be quartered in private buildings if quarters were not
provided for them within 24 hours
following a request. The Massachusetts Government Act gave the royal
government the exclusive power to
appoint judges and prosecutors and
prohibited town meetings without
the permission of the royal governor.
The Administration of Justice Act allowed the governor to order trials of
persons arrested in Massachusetts to
take place in other colonies, in order to prevent magistrates and juries
from acquitting local residents who
were hostile to the governor. The
Quebec Act permitted the free exercise of the Roman Catholic Religion
in Quebec, but it also provided no
elected legislative assembly, creating—as the other colonists saw it—a
tyranny that might spread to the
other colonies.

The delegates to the First Continental Congress did not act as if they had the power to pass laws or take any other governmental
actions. Instead, the delegates merely adopted resolutions and submitted letters and petitions of grievances to the King. Before adjourning, the First Continental Congress agreed
to reconvene on May 10, 1775, in Philadelphia.
FYI
Before the appointed date for the Second
Continental Congress arrived, war broke out
The records of the First and Second
in Massachusetts. The fighting started with the
Continental Congress are collected
battle of Lexington and Concord on April 19,
and published in the Journals of the
Continental Congress, 1774-1789
1775. In that battle, local militiamen defeated
(Worthington C. Ford et al. eds.
British troops who had come to seize their stores
1904-37), the full text of which is
of weapons. Following the battle, colonists
available at the Library of Congress’s
drove the British troops back to Boston and surwebsite: http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwjc.html.
rounded the city.
It was in these circumstances that the
Second Continental Congress began to meet in
Philadelphia on May 10, 1775. The Congress included delegates from each of the thirteen
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colonies. These delegates included many famous men of the founding era, such as John
Hancock, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, and Thomas Jefferson.
Like the First Continental Congress, the Second Continental Congress had no clear legislative authority. It could adopt resolutions, but could not pass laws or impose taxes.
Nevertheless, on June 15, 1775, the Second Continental Congress decided to assume
authority over the American forces surrounding Boston, resolving that “a General be
appointed to command all the continental forces, raised, or to be raised, for the defence of
American liberty.” It then unanimously selected George Washington for this position. The
Second Continental Congress also appointed additional subordinate officers, and it agreed
to finance the military (although obtaining the funds for this purpose proved difficult).
Over the course of the next eleven months, fighting between American and British forces
continued.
By the summer of 1776, the war had convinced the colonists that the colonies could
no longer remain a part of the United Kingdom. Accordingly, on July 4, 1776, the Second
Continental Congress adopted the Declaration of Independence. With this declaration,
the fighting with Great Britain became a war for independence. The war for independence—known now as the “Revolution” or “Revolutionary War”—lasted seven years. The
American forces lost most of the battles, but held together and eventually prevailed. In
1783, the United Kingdom acknowledged the independence of the United States in the
Treaty of Paris, and the war ended.

3. The Articles of Confederation and the Calling of a Constitutional Convention
The Declaration of Independence proclaimed that the colonies had become “free and
independent states.” But these independent states needed to work together to prevail
against the United Kingdom. In 1777, while the Revolutionary War was still being fought,
the Continental Congress drafted a document called the Articles of Confederation. This
document was finally approved by all of the states in 1781.
The Articles of Confederation was more like a multilateral treaty among allies than a
formal constitution for a new national government. The document announced that its
purpose was to create a “firm league of friendship” among the former colonies, which had
now become something more akin to separate states. It emphasized that each “state retains
its sovereignty, freedom, and independence.”
Food for Thought
The newly independent states did
not create a strong national government in the Articles of Confederation. Why might they have felt reluctant to do that even though the
Revolutionary War clearly showed
that the states needed to work together?

Under the Articles of Confederation, the
states would continue to send delegates to a
Congress just as they had done before. The
Congress had limited power to pass laws, with
each state having one vote. But the government
was not effective. All measures required the
unanimous assent of the states. The Congress
had no way to enforce laws or collect taxes.
There were no national courts. In addition, the
unity of the states became strained over trade
and other issues.
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In 1787, the weaknesses in the Articles of Confederation led the Congress to call
for a convention “for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions
therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states render the federal
constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government & the preservation of the Union.”
Notwithstanding the Congress’s mandate, the convention quickly adopted as its task the
drafting of a new Constitution. Accordingly, the convention became known as the “Constitutional Convention of 1787” (or sometimes the “Philadelphia Convention” or the “Federal
Convention”).
The states each could send as many “deputies” as they wanted to the Constitutional
Convention. At the Convention, however, the
FYI
delegates decided that each state would have
only one vote. In total, fifty-five men attended
Although the Constitutional Conthe Convention. These men represented all of
vention met in secret and the memthe states except Rhode Island, which chose not
bers agreed not to discuss what took
place, we now know a great deal
to participate. The deputies, whom we now call
about what transpired at the prothe “Framers” of the Constitution, included
ceedings. The Convention appointgrand eminences such as George Washington
ed a secretary, who kept an official
and Benjamin Franklin; visionary political
journal. In addition, at least eight of
the fifty-five members took notes at
thinkers such as James Madison, Alexander
the Convention. By great fortune,
Hamilton, James Wilson, and Roger Sherman;
James Madison, who was the inteland masters of written expression such as Goulectual leader of the delegates, took
verneur Morris, who did most of the final stylisthe most extensive notes. The records and notes are collected in The
tic editing of the Constitution. The deputies
Records of the Federal Convention of
also included dissenters, such as George Mason
1787 (Max Farrand, ed., 1911), a
of Virginia, who refused to vote for the docusource cited by more than 100 Sument because it did not contain a bill of rights,
preme Court cases. The Library of
Congress’s website contains the full
and Robert Yates and John Lansing, Jr., who left
text of this work: http://memory.loc.
the Convention early because they believed that
gov/ammem/amlaw/lwfr.html.
their instructions from the New York legislature
did not permit them to participate in creating a
new constitution.

4. Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention
As the cases in this book will show, in interpreting the Constitution, the Supreme
Court often looks very carefully at what the deputies argued and decided at the Constitutional Convention.3 To understand the Court’s frequent references to the deputies’ debates,
readers of the Court’s opinions should know what happened in Philadelphia. Basically, the
Convention took place in nine chronological segments:
1. Full Convention (May 14 - May 29). The Convention began by unanimously selecting George Washington to serve as the Convention’s president. It then adopted rules gov3
As discussed in Part C of this Chapter, many writers disagree about whether it is possible to discern the original
meaning of the Constitution from these debates and, in any event, whether the original meaning should govern
modern interpretation of the Constitution.
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erning the proceedings. These rules specified, among other things, that each state present
and fully represented would have one vote and that the proceedings would be kept secret.
On May 29, 1787, Edmund Randolph offered 15 resolutions, each just one sentence in
length. These resolutions—which became known as the “Virginia Plan” for government—
reflected the ideas of James Madison. Under the plan, there would be a national legislature
that would have two chambers, one directly elected and the other appointed by the state
legislatures. The plan generally favored the states with large populations (Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia) because it called for proportional representation in
both houses. After Randolph made this proposal, the Convention decided to deliberate as
a committee of the whole (i.e., a gathering where all of the deputies could discuss the issues
under informal rules of debate).
2. Committee of the Whole (May 30 - June 13). On the first day when the deputies met
as a committee of the whole, Gouverneur Morris urged Randolph to modify his resolutions to include the following proposal: “Resolved, that a national government ought to be
established consisting of a supreme Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary.” The committee
of the whole voted to adopt this resolution. With this action, the committee of the whole
implicitly endorsed creating a new Constitution as the goal of the Convention, rather than
merely amending the Articles of Confederation.
3. Full Convention (June 13 - June 15). The Convention formally debated the Virginia
Plan from June 13 to June 15. The small states opposed the Virginia Plan because they
believed that their votes would be diluted in a national legislature with proportional representation. On June 15, William Paterson of New Jersey proposed a set of nine alternative
resolutions, which became known as the “New Jersey Plan.” The New Jersey Plan favored
small states. Most significantly, the plan called for a unicameral legislature with equal
representation for each state. The Convention again decided to meet as a committee of the
whole, this time to discuss the New Jersey Plan.
4. Committee of the Whole (June 16 - June 19). The committee of the whole debated and
ultimately rejected the New Jersey Plan. It also considered an alternative plan proposed by
Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton’s plan called for an executive elected for life and senators
chosen for life. The plan would have reduced state sovereignty by allowing the national
executive to appoint executives for each state government.
5. Full Convention (June 19 - July 26). Important debates about representation in the
legislative branch followed the rejection of the New Jersey Plan. The large and small states
could not agree on the composition of the legislative branch. Ultimately, a modified version of the Virginia Plan became acceptable to the Convention after the delegates agreed to
what has become known as the “Great Compromise” (or alternatively as the “Connecticut
Compromise”). In this compromise, the states would have equal representation in the Senate and proportional representation in the House. This compromise balanced the interests
of large and small states. The Convention also adopted the closely related three-fifths rule,
under which only three-fifths of a state’s slave population would be counted for determining representation in the House. This feature split the difference between Southern states,
which wanted all slaves counted for this purpose, and Northern states, which opposed
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counting any slaves in determining state entitlement to representation in the House.
In addition to the Great Compromise, the Convention also addressed a variety of other
important topics. These included the term of the executive’s service, the appointment of
judges, and the process for ratifying the Constitution. On July 26th, with the general structure of the government settled, the Convention created a “Committee of Detail” to turn the
plan into a draft. The Convention recessed while the Committee of Detail performed its
work.
6. Committee of Detail (July 27 - August 5). John Rutledge, Edmund Randolph, and
James Wilson did most of the work of the Committee of Detail. In addition to describing
the government and the selection of its members, the Committee of Detail added the list
of congressional powers and the list of limitations on state powers now found in Article I.
When the Committee of Detail finished, its draft was printed and distributed to all of the
deputies.
7. Full Convention (August 6 - September 6). The Full Convention then debated the Committee of Detail’s draft and other important matters. They considered suffrage qualifications, immigration, slavery, and the veto power. During this time, the Convention referred
some matters to separate committees, which met and reported back to the Convention.
After reaching final conclusions on most items, the Convention appointed a “Committee of
Style” (sometimes called the “Committee on Style and Arrangement”). The Committee of
Style was charged with the task of putting the Constitution in a consistent form.
8. Committee of Style (September 6 - September 12). The Committee of Style put all of
the Convention’s changes into the draft and polished the text. Gouverneur Morris did
much of the work, although the Committee also included James Madison, William Johnson, Rufus King, and Alexander Hamilton. Their work is seen as very important because
they formulated the precise expression of many of the Constitution’s great clauses. The
Committee of Style finished its assignment on September 12, and a printer made copies of
its draft for all of the deputies.
9. Full Convention (September 12 - September 17). The Convention then debated the
Committee of Style’s draft for several days. During this time, George Mason and Elbridge
Gerry proposed the inclusion of a bill of rights. The Convention debated but rejected
this proposal. Two days later, on September 17, 1787, the state delegations present at
the Convention unanimously approved the Constitution. All of the individual delegates
present except for Gerry, Mason, and Randolph signed the Constitution. The Convention
then adjourned.

5. Ratification of the Constitution
The Constitution, by its own terms, could not go into effect until ratified. Article
VII said: “The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the
Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.” Under this
provision, each state legislature was expected to form a ratifying convention to debate and
vote on the Constitution. In the fall of 1787 and spring and early summer of 1788, the
states held these ratifying conventions.
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Whether the proposed Constitution would be ratified was an open question. The
Constitution would make many substantial changes to the status quo. Although some
people favored ratification, many others did not. Public debate spread throughout the
states on the subject. Supporters of the Constitution became known as the “Federalists,”
while opponents became known as the “Anti-Federalists.”
Three of the best known Federalists were
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John
Jay. In the fall of 1787 and spring of 1788,
they wrote a series of 85 essays explaining the
Constitution and urging its ratification in the
State of New York. Each of these essays was
titled “The Federalist” followed by a number
designating its order in the series. Historians
typically refer to the 85 essays as the “Federalist
Papers.” These essays, all of which are available online, address nearly every aspect of the
Constitution. Although the essays are advocacy
documents and not dispassionate legal analyses,
they have been remarkably influential. As you
will see in reading the cases in this book, the
Supreme Court regularly relies on these essays
in attempting to discern the original meaning of
the Constitution.

FYI
The Federalist Papers are clearly the
most influential source of the original meaning of the Constitution other than the text of the Constitution
itself. The Supreme Court has cited
the Federalist Papers in more than
400 cases. The Library of Congress’s
website contains the full text of the
Federalist Papers: http://thomas.loc.
gov/home/histdox/fedpapers.html.
For more information on the Federalist Papers, see Gregory Maggs,
A Concise Guide to the Records of the
State Ratifying Conventions as a Source
of the Original Meaning of the U.S.
Constitution, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 457.

The Anti-Federalists opposed the Constitution for a number of reasons. Two of the
most important concerned the protection of state sovereignty and individual rights. Opponents felt that the Constitution gave too much power to the federal government at the
expense of the states. They also worried that the
Constitution did not contain a bill of rights that
FYI
would limit the powers of the government. In
thinking about these opponents of the ConstituMany records from the state ratifying conventions are collected in The
tion, modern readers should remember that
Debates in the Several State Conventheir concerns stemmed from having lived
tions on the Adoption of the Federal
through Parliament’s oppression of the colonies.
Constitution, As Recommended by the
General Convention at Philadelphia, in
1787 (Jonathan Elliot, ed. 1836-59).
This work, often called Elliot’s Debates for short, has been very influential; the Supreme Court has cited
it in over 100 cases. The full text
is available online at the Library of
Congress’s website: http://memory.
loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwed.html.

By the summer of 1788, conventions in
nine states had approved the Constitution, putting it into effect among the ratifying states. As
the following table indicates, ratification was
uncontroversial in Delaware, New Jersey, and
Georgia. Each of these small states unanimously
ratified the document.
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But the Constitution was much more controversial in other states. Indeed, switching
just a few votes in big states like New York or Virginia might have scuttled the entire project.

State

Date of
Ratification

Vote

Delaware

Dec. 7, 1787

30-0

Pennsylvania

Dec. 12, 1787

46-23

New Jersey

Dec. 18, 1787

38-0

Georgia

Jan. 2, 1788

26-0

Connecticut

Jan. 9, 1788

128-40

Massachusetts

Feb. 6, 1788

187-168

Maryland

Apr. 28, 1788

63-11

South Carolina

May 23, 1788

149-73

New Hampshire

Jun. 21, 1788

57-47

Virginia

Jun. 25, 1788

89-79

New York

Jul. 26, 1788

30-27

North Carolina

Nov. 21, 1789

195-77

Rhode Island

May 29, 1790

34-32

6. The First Congress
Federal elections took place during the fall of 1788, and the new government under
the Constitution began in 1789. George Washington, of course, became the first President.
In the First Congress, which met from March 1789 to March 1791, a total of 29 persons
served as senators and 66 served as representatives.
FYI
Because the First Congress laid so
much of the foundation for the
new nation, the Supreme Court
often looks to its acts for guidance
in determining the original meaning of the Constitution. The acts
of the First Congress are published
in volume 1 of The Public Statutes at
Large of the United States of America
(1845), the citation of which is abbreviated as “1 Stat.” The Library
of Congress has the full text at its
website:
http://memory.loc.gov/
ammem/amlaw/lwsl.html.

Many of these senators and representatives
justifiably could consider themselves experts on
the Constitution. Ten of the senators and eleven
of the representatives had served as deputies at
the Constitutional Convention. Some of them,
including James Madison, Oliver Ellsworth, and
Roger Sherman, had played prominent roles in
the Constitution’s drafting. Other members of
the First Congress, such as Richard Henry Lee,
had participated at state ratifying conventions
even though they had not attended the Constitutional Convention.
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During its two-year term, the First Congress passed an astounding 96 acts. Among its
many other accomplishments, the First Congress:
• imposed taxes on imported goods and on vessels entering United States ports, providing the first source of federal revenue;
• shaped the executive branch by establishing the Departments of Foreign Affairs,
War, and Treasury;
• created the federal judicial system;
• passed laws on naturalization, patents, copyrights, and other subjects still governed
by federal law;
• established a system of lighthouses, the post office, and the Bank of the United
States;
• provided for the assumption of state revolutionary war debts and paying of the
national debt; and
• located the seat of government in the District of Columbia and admitted Kentucky
and Vermont into the Union.
• The First Congress also proposed twelve amendments to the Constitution, ten of
which (now known as the Bill of Rights) received quick ratification by the states.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

B. Organization of the Constitution
The Constitution contains a number of different parts. No one expects a new student
of constitutional law to commit the document to memory or to master its provisions in one
reading. But before going further, you should take some time to become familiar with its
organization.

Preamble
The Constitution starts with an introduction, or “Preamble,” which lists the six goals
of the People in adopting the Constitution: “to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” Although lofty
in tone, the courts mostly have concluded that the language of the Preamble is precatory.
In other words, it does not create legal rights, duties, or powers. But the Preamble is still
important. For example, it makes clear that the “People” rather than the states adopted
the Constitution. We will consider this distinction in cases about the nature of the United
States’ sovereignty.

Article I
Following the Preamble, the Constitution contains seven articles. The first three arti-
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cles reflect the Framers’ vision that there are three branches of government: the legislative
branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Each has its own powers and has
some ability to provide checks on the others. But as we will see in Chapter 6, sometimes
questions arise about whether one branch is attempting to exercise powers belonging to
another branch.
Article I contains ten sections that address the legislative branch. Section 1 establishes
the fundamental point that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”
This means, among other things, that Congress has these powers, and that the President
and the courts do not. You will read about this provision in famous cases like Youngstown
Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), in which the Court held that the President
was unconstitutionally attempting to assert powers that were legislative in nature.
Sections 2 through 6 then tell how senators and representatives are selected, what their
qualifications must be, how they are paid, and so forth. These provisions come up in the
important case of U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), a case invalidating an
attempt to add what amounted to additional restrictions on who could run for the House
or Senate.
Section 7 describes the procedure that Congress must follow in order to pass a law. As
most high school civics classes teach, the House and Senate have to approve a bill, and the
President must sign it. If the President vetoes a bill (i.e., rejects it), the House and Senate
can override the veto with a two-thirds vote. But we will see in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983), that Congress has sometimes been tempted to look for ways to exercise power
without involving the President.
Section 8 then lists the subjects upon which Congress may pass laws. It says that Congress may collect taxes, regulate commerce, establish a post office, and so forth. Chapter
3 of this book covers what Congress may and may not do under Article I, section 8. We
will see in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), that Congress has the power to pass legislation protecting
civil rights. On the other hand, we will see in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995),
and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), that the Supreme Court has struck
down laws attempting to ban guns from schools or order the states to provide for the
disposal of radioactive waste as being beyond the power of Congress to enact.
Sections 9 and 10 state various specific prohibitions. Section 9 says that Congress
generally cannot suspend the writ of habeas corpus, pass ex post facto laws, tax exports
from states, or give preference to one state’s ports. Section 10 then tells us some of the
things that the states may not do. They cannot enter treaties or coin money, impose duties
on imports and exports, and so forth.

Article II
Article II concerns the executive branch. The Chief Executive, of course, is the President of the United States. Article II, section 1 says: “The executive Power shall be vested
in a President of the United States of America.” But the President does not act alone. The
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federal departments and agencies assist the President. The Constitution does not create
these departments, but in various provisions it contemplates their existence. Congress has
created many such departments, including the Department of Justice, the Department of
Defense, the State Department, and so forth.
The President is the chief executive. In general, that makes everyone else in the executive branch subordinate to the President. The President generally exercises control by
firing or threatening to fire those who will not carry out his lawful policies. But we will
see in cases like Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and Morrison
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), that Congress may place some limits on the ability of the
President to control subordinates in this manner.
Section 2 puts the President in charge of the military, and allows him to grant pardons
and appoint judges and other office holders. Section 3 requires the President to report
to Congress, receive ambassadors, make sure that the laws are faithfully executed, and so
forth.

Article III
Article III describes the power of the federal judiciary. The first sentence of Section
1 tells us that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.” Section 2 then tells about the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts. For
example, it says that they can hear lawsuits between “Citizens of different States,” which we
know as diversity jurisdiction. We will see in the first case included in Chapter 2, Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), that the Court struck down a federal statute that
attempted to give the Court jurisdiction beyond the limits of Article III, section 2.

Articles IV - VII
Articles IV through VII contain a variety of different provisions. Article IV generally
addresses relations among the states. As we will see in Chapter 4, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause in Article IV limits discrimination by states against citizens of other
states. Article V discusses the amendment process. The House and Senate can propose
amendments by a two-thirds vote or two-thirds of the states can call a convention. (The
latter route for amendment has never been used.) Proposals for amending the Constitution
become effective when three-fourths of the states have ratified them in their legislatures
or in conventions. Article VI tells us, among other things, that the “Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States *** shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” Article VII describes
the ratification process that had to occur before the Constitution could take effect.

Amendments
The Constitution now contains 27 amendments. The first 10 amendments, commonly called the Bill of Rights, protect a large number of individual rights. Amendments
13 through 15 are known as the “Civil War Era Amendments” or the “Reconstruction
Amendments” because they were passed at the end of the Civil War during the process of
Reconstruction. They abolish slavery, bar states from denying equal protection of the laws
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or due process of the law to any person, and protect voting rights. We will be looking
extensively at the First Amendment’s protection of Free Speech, Free Press, and Religion,
and at the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of Equal Protection and Due Process, in the
second half of this book.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

C. Methods of Interpreting the Constitution
One of the many things that distinguished the American Constitution at the time
of its ratification was the simple fact that it was written down. (Although the United
Kingdom—the nation from which the United States broke but from which it inherited its
legal tradition—also had a “constitution,” it was developed over time, in a common-law
fashion, rather than codified.) At first blush, one might expect there to be little need for a
thick casebook of judicial opinions for matters governed by a written document. But the
study of American constitutional law has, from the very beginning, been as much a study
of judicial interpretations of the Constitution as it has been of the document itself. We will
see one of the reasons why this is so in Chapter 2 when we consider Marbury v. Madison
and the topic of judicial review. But answering the question of who should get to interpret
the Constitution—a question on which there is substantial continuing debate, as we will
see in Chapter 2—does not tell us why a written Constitution should so frequently require
interpretation in the first place. As it turns out, there has long been a need for interpretation of the Constitution because it is often not obvious, even after careful consultation of
the text of the Constitution, what the Constitution tells us about important questions.
There are several reasons why this is so. First, the Framers of the Constitution (and
those who ratified it) sought to preserve some degree of flexibility for subsequent generations to address pressing problems and, if necessary, to structure the government accordingly. Second, as described above, although the Framers were able to achieve consensus by
compromising on some controversial questions, they masked their disagreement on other
questions by writing general and vague provisions. Third, the Framers simply did not
anticipate some of the questions that would arise in the future. Today’s problems often look
very different from the problems of 1789—or 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified. Accordingly, the plain text of the Constitution often does not speak directly to
questions that are likely to arise today.
One possible response to constitutional silence would be to conclude that if the Constitution does not expressly prohibit a particular action, it permits it. The Constitution,
after all, is almost entirely about the limits on governmental, rather than private, action—
the sole (and obviously incredibly important) exception being the Thirteenth Amendment,
which prohibits slavery—and one could sensibly conclude that if the Constitution does not
prohibit the government from taking a certain action, it implicitly permits it. There is great
appeal to this approach; indeed, as we will see, among other things, it attempts to preserve
democratic government by preventing judicial interference with the modern choices of
democratically elected officials. But even if one is persuaded that it is the proper response
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to constitutional silence, it does not help us to determine when in fact the Constitution is
silent on a particular question. This is because the Constitution’s broad provisions arguably
touch on a wide range of topics, even though they fail to provide specific guidance on most
controversial questions that are likely to arise.
Indeed, the Constitution tends to speak at very high levels of generality. There is little
doubt, for example, that the First Amendment protects the freedom of speech, but it does
not define “freedom” or “speech.” Is a contribution to a candidate for public office a form
of “speech”? See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), which we will consider in Chapter
14. What about publicly burning a draft card as a form of protest against an ongoing war?
See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), which we will also consider in Chapter
14. And even if we can agree on what counts as speech, does a law imposing some limits
on the ability to engage in a particular form of speech—but not prohibiting it entirely—
“abridg[e]” the “freedom” protected by the Amendment? Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States from denying to persons the “equal protection of the laws,” but it
does not give any more guidance about what those terms mean—whether, for example, the
government is ever permitted to distinguish among citizens and, if so, whether some bases
for classification are more problematic than others; and, if so, whether a State can justify a
particular suspect classification—such as a requirement that drivers over 70 years old, but
not younger drivers, get annual eye exams, or a ban on women serving in combat in the
military—with sufficiently compelling reasons. Even determining whether the Constitution is “silent,” therefore, requires interpretation of the document’s broad terms.
Of course, the Constitution is not unusual among written texts in requiring interpretation to determine its meaning. Courts routinely are called upon, for example, to interpret
statutes and contracts, written texts that only sometimes speak with great detail, and often
speak in broad generalities—or, with respect to issues that are litigated, are entirely silent.
Although interpretation of such documents is commonplace, there are a range of interpretive approaches that courts follow—and substantial debate over which are appropriate and
defensible. In the context of statutory interpretation, for example, there are lively debates over
FYI
whether judges should consider legislative history to determine statutory meaning, or whether
There is an extensive literature on
courts should seek to discern congressional
the appropriate way for courts to
purposes in order to shed light on how Coninterpret statutes. For a taste of the
debate, compare John F. Manning,
gress would have chosen to address particular
Textualism as a Nondelegation Doccircumstances about which the statute is silent.
trine, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 673 (1997),
Similarly, there is a long-standing debate over
with Alexander Alienikoff, Updating
whether, in interpreting a contract, courts
Statutory Interpretation, 87 Mich. L.
Rev. 20, 47-61 (1988).
should consider only the plain meaning of the
contract’s terms or instead may consider extrinsic evidence to determine a contract’s meaning.
But even assuming that there is a “correct” way to interpret statutes and contracts,
matters are at least arguably more complex when the document at issue is the Constitution,
because the Constitution is quite different from a statute or a contract in many important
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ways. First, as we will see when we consider Marbury v. Madison in Chapter 2, the Constitution is understood to be a form of “higher” law—that is, it cannot be superseded by an
ordinary statute enacted by Congress, and (by its own express terms, in the Supremacy
Clause of Article VI) it trumps state law that is inconsistent with its provisions. Second, by
its own terms (in Article V), the Constitution can be amended only after obtaining a supermajority consensus—a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Congress and ratification by
three-quarters of the States—that has rarely been achieved in over two hundred years. As
noted above, there have been only 27 Amendments, and even that number tends to overstate the ease with which the Constitution may be amended: the ten Amendments in the
Bill of Rights were adopted together two years after ratification of the original document,
and one other (the Twenty-Seventh) was proposed along with the original Bill of Rights;
three Amendments were adopted within only a few years after the Civil War; and two of the
Amendments—the Eighteenth, enshrining Prohibition, and the Twenty-First, repealing
it—effectively cancel each other out. Indeed, not only is it difficult to amend the Constitution, but Article V actually states that some of its provisions cannot be amended at all, even
with the requisite support of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress and three-fourths of
the states. Perhaps more strikingly, the provision that cannot be amended today is the one
that gives each state an equal voice in the Senate, even though that provision arguably is
the single most anti-democratic provision in the Constitution itself. Third, and particularly important in light of the first two distinctive features, the Constitution is over 200
years old.
Food for Thought
The provision in the Constitution
providing the requirements for its
ratification itself was inconsistent
with the “constitution” that was in
force at the time it was adopted. Although Article VII provided that the
Constitution would become effective
upon ratification by nine of the thirteen states, the Articles of Confederation expressly required unanimous
consent of the states for any amendments to its terms. What does this
suggest about the extent to which we
should treat the current Constitution
as binding?

Together, these features of the Constitution—its status as higher law, the difficulty of
amending it, and its age—stand in uneasy tension with the notion of democracy. Indeed, the
very notion of constitutionalism means that
democratically elected majorities today cannot
decide to govern themselves in the manner of
their choosing if their choices would conflict
with the Constitution. This tension is generally
known as the “dead-hand problem”: to embrace
constitutionalism is to accept that the men who
wrote and ratified the Constitution to govern
them over 200 years ago should also be able
to reach into the future, with their now-dead
hands, and tell us how to live our lives.

One possible response to the dead-hand
problem, of course, would be to deny the continuing binding force of the Constitution. It is, after all, merely a collection of words with
no independent force beyond our willingness to follow it. But this response historically
has held little appeal, because each successive generation has seen great value in binding
itself to a charter for self-governance. First, it would be difficult for government to function
without rules for the proper exercise of its power. Second, there is good reason to limit the
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power of democratic majorities. The Constitution is a form of self-imposed paternalism, to
prevent us from letting the perceived exigencies of the moment lead us to decisions that,
upon reflection and with the clarity of hindsight, we know are destructive of our most
deeply held values.
And, as explained above, if we are to embrace the Constitution, then we must have
some way to interpret it. The debate over how to interpret the Constitution is at least
as old as the Constitution itself and tends to reflect the basic tension created by the very
notion of constitutionalism. On the one hand, if we accept that the Constitution is a form
of law (albeit higher law), then there is a strong argument that we should interpret it as we
would any other law—to have a generally fixed content, determined by the will of those
who enacted it, embodied either in their intentions, in the text itself, or in the understanding of that text at the time it was enacted. Indeed, one could forcefully argue that if
the Constitution did not mean what its Framers thought it meant—or at least something
closely approximating, at some level of generality, what they thought it meant—then the
Constitution would not truly be a form of law in any conventional sense. This conception
of the proper way to interpret the Constitution forms the theoretical basis of the approach
to interpretation known as “originalism.” Proponents of originalism argue that a provision
of the Constitution must mean today what it meant, or perhaps was understood to mean,
when it was ratified.
On the other hand, if we are concerned about the dead-hand problem and its seeming
inconsistency with our democratic impulses today, then we might seek to interpret the
Constitution in a way that reflects values that have enduring support, and not simply those
that were important at the time of the Founding. According to this view, if the Constitution
is binding principally because we agree to be bound by it, and we are eager to be bound
by it only if we perceive it to be legitimate according to contemporary values, then we
must update the Constitution in order to preserve it. This conception of the proper way to
interpret the Constitution is often called “non-originalism,” defined in contrast to what it is
not. Most non-originalists rely to some degree on the original meaning of the Constitution,
at least at a high level of generality, but also see room for constitutional meaning to evolve.
The debate over these competing views reflects the fundamental paradox of constitutionalism: if the Constitution is a form of law, then its meaning to the people who adopted
it must be central to its meaning today. But do those people have a right to bind us to
their choices? In the sections that follow, we consider the conventional arguments for and
against originalism and non-originalism.

1. Originalism
Originalism is an approach to interpretation that accords dispositive weight to the
original meaning of the Constitution. According to this approach, a provision of the Constitution must mean today what it meant when it was adopted. Under an originalist
approach, for example, if the Constitution did not prohibit capital punishment in 1789—
or in 1791, when the Bill of Rights was ratified, or in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amend-
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FYI
Some originalists seek the original
“intent” of the Framers, some seek
the original “understanding” of the
Constitution by the Framers or the
ratifiers, and still others seek the
original “objective meaning” of the
Constitution. What are the differences among those three concepts?
Should judges apply different inquiries depending upon whether they
seek original intent, understanding,
or objective meaning?

ment was ratified—then it does not prohibit it
today.
Conversely, under an originalist
approach, if the Constitution in 1789—or,
again, in 1791 or 1868—did not authorize
Congress to rely on its authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate certain matters,
then arguably Congress lacks that power today,
as well. (We will consider in Chapter 3 whether
changes in the nature of “commerce” inevitably
should lead to the conclusion that Congress has
greater power to regulate local matters today
than it did at the time of the Framing.)

Proponents of originalism generally offer
three principal arguments in support of their
approach to interpreting the Constitution.
First, they argue that originalism is the only
approach to constitutional interpretation that properly recognizes the Constitution’s status
as law. Second, they argue that originalism is necessary to preserve democratic values.
Third, they argue that originalism is uniquely promising for constraining the ability of
judges to impose their own personal views under the guise of constitutional interpretation.
We discuss these claims in turn.
First, originalists generally argue that because we have always treated written law as
having a fixed meaning—this is true, for example, for statutes, whose meaning does not
generally evolve over time—the Constitution, which is a form of law, must have a fixed
meaning, as well. And, originalists argue, just as a statute’s meaning is determined by
reference to the understandings of the people who enacted it, the meaning of a provision of
the Constitution must also be determined by reference to the people who were responsible
for its enactment. Originalists do not necessarily deny the existence of the dead-hand
problem, but they argue that if the Constitution is authoritative only to the extent that we
agree with it today, then it is not really law at all but instead is simply a makeweight.
Second, proponents of originalism argue that only their approach is consistent with
the proper judicial role in a democratic society. Any approach other than originalism,
they argue, inevitably seeks constitutional meaning in evolving or current values. But
a democratic system, they argue, does not need constitutional guarantees to ensure that
its laws reflect current values. And it is fundamentally anti-democratic, they contend, to
permit unelected judges to invalidate democratically enacted laws that are not inconsistent
with the original meaning of the Constitution.
Third, originalists contend that because judicial review is by its very nature countermajoritarian—a theme that we will explore in detail in Chapter 2—it is essential to ensure
that judges employing it exercise, in Alexander Hamilton’s words, “judgment” rather than
“will,” The Federalist No. 78—that is, that judges simply interpret the law rather than make
the law. Because the original meaning of the Constitution is fixed, originalists argue, it can
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be objectively determined by a judge without reference to his own political preferences. In
contrast, they argue, if the Constitution’s meaning “evolves,” but derives from something
other than democratic enactments, then the judges seeking the Constitution’s meaning will
not be restrained in their ability to impose their own personal views under the guise of
constitutional interpretation.
The basic approach of originalism, of course, is not a new approach to interpretation.
But it has attracted renewed attention and support in the last few decades, in part as a
response to the perceived non-originalism of the Supreme Court in the 1950s and 1960s,
an era that saw a substantial judicial expansion of rights subject to constitutional protection.

Perspective and Analysis
Justice Antonin Scalia has arguably been the most well-known and influential
originalist. Consider his defense of the approach:
[O]riginalism seems to me more compatible with the nature and purpose of a Constitution in a democratic system. A democratic society does not, by and large, need
constitutional guarantees to insure that its laws will reflect “current values.” Elections
take care of that quite well. The purpose of constitutional guarantees *** is precisely
to prevent the law from reflecting certain changes in original values that the society
adopting the Constitution thinks fundamentally undesirable.

He has also criticized the alternatives to originalism:
[T]he central practical defect of nonoriginalism is fundamental and irreparable: the
impossibility of achieving any consensus on what, precisely, is to replace original
meaning, once that is abandoned. *** [In contrast, originalism] establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the judge
himself.

Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 862-64
(1989).

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2. Non-Originalism
In contrast, non-originalists generally believe that the Constitution’s meaning today
is not always the meaning that it had when it was ratified. Non-originalists accordingly
look to a range of sources in interpreting the Constitution. This is not to say that all non-
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originalists believe that the original meaning is irrelevant to constitutional interpretation;
to the contrary, virtually all theories of constitutional interpretation accord significant—
and in some cases dispositive—weight to the original meaning. Non-originalists often
conclude that the original meaning of a constitutional provision, expressed at a very high
level of generality, provides guidance for ascertaining the relevant constitutional rule. Nonoriginalists, for example, might read the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to announce a general rule about equal treatment, which they might be willing to
apply in a manner that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not contemplate,
such as to discrimination on the basis of gender. But, for the reasons discussed below,
non-originalists sometimes are willing to depart from the original meaning.
Non-originalists also often look to judicial precedent in seeking constitutional meaning. In this way, many non-originalists view constitutional interpretation as something
akin to common-law decision-making, with constitutional principles evolving gradually
over time. Non-originalists also often look to state practices to determine whether broad
consensus has developed that a particular action or practice is acceptable or unacceptable.
For example, if public flogging is banned in all
states but one—and has been illegal in all states
Make the Connection
but one for decades—then a non-originalist
might conclude that public flogging today is a
As we will see in Chapter 7, the Supreme Court has held that the Due
“cruel and unusual” punishment within the
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
meaning of the Eighth Amendment, even though
Amendment “incorporated” most of
it likely was not thought to be cruel and unusual
the provisions in the Bill of Rights,
in 1791, when the Eighth Amendment was ratiapplying their limits to state, as well
as federal, action.
fied, or in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.
Non-originalists are willing to depart from
the original meaning of the Constitution because of concerns about originalism itself. Nonoriginalists have generally disputed originalists’ claims that originalism is likely to produce
determinate constitutional meaning today. More fundamentally, non-originalists argue that
departure from the original meaning often is necessary to ensure that the Constitution
retains legitimacy, which is essential if the public is to continue to accept the Constitution’s
binding character. We discuss these claims in turn.
First, non-originalists contend that most difficult constitutional questions that arise
today cannot be answered by simple reference to the original understanding. They observe
that the historical record is silent on many important provisions of the Constitution; that
when the Framers did discuss the meaning of a particular provision of the Constitution,
they often disagreed about its meaning; and that, in any event, the Framers did not contemplate, let alone discuss, most of the difficult questions that arise today or how the
Constitution would apply to those problems. Accordingly, non-originalists argue that
resort to the original meaning is unlikely to produce determinate constitutional meaning
today. Non-originalists also argue that this likely indeterminism undermines the claim
that originalism is uniquely promising as a way to constrain judges from imposing their
own views under the guise of constitutional interpretation; faced with an ambiguous or
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indeterminate historical record, non-originalists contend, judges have discretion to choose
the evidence of original meaning that best reflects their own personal values.
Second, and more important, non-originalists argue that originalism fails to account
for the dead-hand problem, and thus risks producing a Constitution that fails the test of
legitimacy. Originalism, non-originalists note, by definition gives voice to the values of the
framing generation, and thus risks producing
Food for Thought
results that the American public today might
find problematic. An originalist approach to the
There is a debate among scholars
Fourteenth Amendment, for example, arguably
about whether Brown was correct
would have required the Court to conclude,
as an originalist matter. Compare
contrary to the decision in Brown v. Board of
Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), that racial segAmerica 76 (1990), and Michael W.
McConnell, Originalism and the Deregation in public schools does not violate the
segregation Decisions, 81 Va. L. Rev.
Equal Protection Clause. Similarly, discrimina947 (1995) (arguing that Brown was
tion on the basis of gender was commonplace in
consistent with the original under1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was
standing of the Fourteenth Amendment), with Alexander Bickel, The
ratified; a faithfully originalist approach almost
Original Understanding and the Segcertainly would permit the states today to proregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev.
hibit women from (among other things) serving
1 (1955), and Michael Klarman,
as lawyers, as they did at the time that the
Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1881 (1995)
Amendment was ratified. See Bradwell v. Illinois,
(arguing that Brown was inconsistent
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
with the original understanding of

the Fourteenth Amendment). We
Non-originalists recognize that the Constiwill consider the decision in Brown,
tution (in Article V) makes explicit provision for
and discrimination on the basis of
the adoption of amendments, but they argue
race and gender, in Chapter 11.
that the potential of the amendment process to
incorporate modern values into the Constitution is illusory. In 1954, for example, when
the Court decided Brown, Southern resistance would have prevented the ratification of an
amendment prohibiting racial segregation. Similarly, as recently as the 1970s, a proposed
amendment to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender failed to achieve ratification
in the required three-quarters of the States. These results, non-originalists contend, would
substantially undermine respect for the Constitution, and thus the public’s willingness to
be bound by the Constitution.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Perspective and Analysis
Justice William Brennan was an influential critic of originalism and a proponent of what some call “Living Constitutionalism.” Consider his view:
A position that upholds constitutional claims only if they were within the specific
contemplation of the Framers in effect establishes a presumption of resolving textual
ambiguities against the claim of constitutional right. *** This is a choice no less political than any other; it expresses antipathy to claims of the minority to rights against
the majority. ***

Justice Brennan did not reject the notion that the Constitution has enduring
principles, defined by the Framers’ choices. But he disagreed with a formulaic
application of those principles:
Current Justices read the Constitution in the only way that we can: as twentiethcentury Americans. We look to the history of the time of the framing and to the
intervening history of interpretation. But the ultimate question must be: What do
the words of the text mean in our time? For the genius of the Constitution rests not
in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the
adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs.

William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 433, 436 (1986).

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
All of this discussion leads to an important question: Which interpretive method does
the Supreme Court use? As you will see, this question has no simple answer. As you read
the Court’s cases, you will find three categories of decisions.
In some cases, especially older ones, the Supreme Court has insisted emphatically that
only the original meaning of the Constitution matters. The decision in South Carolina v.
United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905), made this point with unmistakable clarity. The Court
said: “The Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That
which it meant when adopted, it means now.” Id. at 448.
In other cases, however, the Court has squarely rejected the idea that it must follow
the original meaning of the Constitution. For example, in Home Building & Loan Assn. v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), which we will consider in Chapter 18, the Court allowed
a state law to alter the obligation of a mortgage contract even though it recognized that
this result likely conflicted with the original understanding of Contracts Clause in Article
I, Section 10. The Court unapologetically rejected the idea that “the great clauses of the
Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions
and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them.” Id. at 443.
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Most modern cases fall somewhere in between these two extremes. Usually, the Court
considers evidence of the original meaning without making broad pronouncements about
whether the original meaning must control. Sometimes the Court follows the original
meaning, and sometimes it does not. Interestingly, even though the current Justices have
very different views on constitutional interpretation, they all cite the Federalist Papers, the
records of the Constitutional Convention, and the state ratifying debates from time to time
because they all consider these sources to be influential. In many cases, the Court tries to
follow the original meaning, but simply cannot agree on what it was. For example, as we
will see in Chapter 4 in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), both the
majority and dissenting opinions claim to follow the original meaning.
In reading the cases in this book, consider not only the results that the Supreme Court
reaches, but also what interpretive methodology the Court is using.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
This section has provided an overview of the competing approaches to constitutional
interpretation. Although we directly address the arguments for originalism and nonoriginalism here, in many respects all of the material that follows in this book speaks, even
if only indirectly, to the same question. Indeed, the judicial decisions in this book about
what the Constitution means often are as much about the appropriate way to interpret the
Constitution as they are about the meaning of the particular provisions at issue. As you
read those materials, be sensitive to the relationship between arguments about the meaning
of particular provisions of the Constitution and arguments about the appropriate way to
interpret the Constitution more generally.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

D. An Illustrative Case
As we have discussed, constitutional interpretation often involves the need to ascribe
concrete meaning to ambiguous text and the need to apply that text to concrete circumstances. What considerations are relevant in engaging in those inquiries?
In the case that follows, the Court considered the constitutionality under the Second
Amendment of the District of Columbia’s prohibition on the possession of handguns in
the home. As you read the three opinions in the case—one for the Court and two in dissent—consider the roles that text, history, structure, and policy play in the interpretations
that the Justices advanced.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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District of Columbia v. Heller
554 U.S. 570 (2008)
Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
The District of Columbia generally prohibits the possession of handguns. It is a
crime to carry an unregistered firearm, and the registration of handguns is prohibited. See
D.C.Code §§ 7-2501.01(12), 7-2502.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001). Wholly apart from
that prohibition, no person may carry a handgun without a license, but the chief of police
may issue licenses for 1-year periods. See §§ 22-4504(a), 22-4506. District of Columbia
law also requires residents to keep their lawfully owned firearms, such as registered long
guns, “unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device” unless they
are located in a place of business or are being used for lawful recreational activities. See
§ 7-2507.02.
[Respondent Dick Heller, a D.C. special police officer authorized to carry a handgun
while on duty at the Federal Judicial Center, wished to keep a handgun at home. He filed a
lawsuit in District Court challenging these provisions under the Second Amendment. The
District Court dismissed respondent’s complaint, but the Court of Appeals directed the
District Court to enter summary judgment for respondent.]
The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”
*** The two sides in this case have set out very different interpretations of the Amendment. Petitioners and today’s dissenting Justices believe that it protects only the right to
possess and carry a firearm in connection with militia service. Respondent argues that it
protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and
to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.
The Second Amendment is naturally divided into two parts: its prefatory clause and its
operative clause. *** Logic demands that there be a link between the stated purpose and
the command. [That] requirement of logical connection may cause a prefatory clause to
resolve an ambiguity in the operative clause ***. But apart from that clarifying function,
a prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause. Therefore,
while we will begin! our textual analysis with the operative clause, we will return to the
prefatory clause to ensure that our reading of the operative clause is consistent with the
announced purpose.
Operative Clause
“Right of the People.” The first salient feature of the operative clause is that it codifies
a “right of the people.” The unamended Constitution and the Bill of Rights use the phrase
“right of the people” two other times, in the First Amendment’s Assembly-and-Petition
Clause and in the Fourth Amendment’s Search-and-Seizure Clause. The Ninth Amendment uses very similar terminology ***. All three of these instances unambiguously refer
to individual rights, not “collective” rights, or rights that may be exercised only through
participation in some corporate body. *** What is more, in all [other] provisions of the
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Constitution that mention “the people,” the term unambiguously refers to all members
of the political community, not an unspecified subset. [This] contrasts markedly with the
phrase “the militia” in the prefatory clause. As we will describe below, the “militia” in
colonial America consisted of a subset of “the people”—those who were male, able bodied, and within a certain age range. Reading the Second Amendment as protecting only
the right to “keep and bear Arms” in an organized militia therefore fits poorly with the
operative clause’s description of the holder of that right as “the people.” We start therefore
with a strong presumption that the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and
belongs to all Americans.
“Keep and bear Arms.” We move now from the holder of the right—“the people”—
to the substance of the right: “to keep and bear Arms.” Before addressing the verbs “keep”
and “bear,” we interpret their object: “Arms.” The 18th-century meaning is no different
from the meaning today. The 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson’s dictionary defined “arms”
as “weapons of offence, or armour of defence.” 1 Dictionary of the English Language 107
(4th ed.) (hereinafter Johnson). *** The term was applied, then as now, to weapons that
were not specifically designed for military use and were not employed in a military capacity.
We turn to the phrases “keep arms” and “bear arms.” Johnson defined “keep” as, most
relevantly, “[t]o retain; not to lose,” and “[t]o have in custody.” Johnson 1095. *** Thus,
the most natural reading of “keep Arms” in the Second Amendment is to “have weapons.”
At the time of the founding, as now, to “bear” meant to “carry.” When used with
“arms,” however, the term has a meaning that refers to carrying for a particular purpose—
confrontation. *** Although the phrase implies that the carrying of the weapon is for the
purpose of “offensive or defensive action,” it in no way connotes participation in a structured military organization. From our review of founding-era sources, we conclude that
this natural meaning was also the meaning that “bear arms” had in the 18th century. In
numerous instances, “bear arms” was unambiguously used to refer to the carrying of weapons outside of an organized militia. The most
prominent examples are those most relevant to
Food for Thought
the Second Amendment: Nine state constitutional provisions written in the 18th century or
As the Court’s discussion makes
the first two decades of the 19th, which
clear, some state constitutions exenshrined a right of citizens to “bear arms in
plicitly extended the right to bear
defense of themselves and the state” or “bear
arms to self-defense. Does this fact
arms in defense of himself and the state.” It is
support or undermine the Court’s
interpretation?
clear from those formulations that “bear arms”
did not refer only to carrying a weapon in an
organized military unit.
Meaning of the Operative Clause. Putting all of these textual elements together, we
find that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation. This meaning is strongly confirmed by the historical background of the Second
Amendment. *** Between the Restoration and the Glorious Revolution, the Stuart Kings
Charles II and James II succeeded in using select militias loyal to them to suppress political
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dissidents, in part by disarming their opponents. These experiences caused Englishmen to
be extremely wary of concentrated military forces run by the state and to be jealous of their
arms. They accordingly obtained an assurance from William and Mary, in the Declaration
of Right (which was codified as the English Bill of Rights), that Protestants would never be
disarmed ***. This right has long been understood to be the predecessor to our Second
Amendment.
By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had become fundamental for
English subjects. Blackstone [cited] the arms provision of the Bill of Rights as one of the
fundamental rights of Englishmen, [describing it as] “the natural right of resistance and
self-preservation” ***. Thus, the right secured in 1689 as a result of the Stuarts’ abuses
was by the time of the founding understood to be an individual right protecting against
both public and private violence. And, of course, what the Stuarts had tried to do to their
political enemies, George III had tried to do to the colonists.
There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second
Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms. [We now determine]
whether the prefatory clause of the Second Amendment comports with our interpretation
of the operative clause. ***
Relationship between Prefatory Clause and Operative Clause
*** The debate with respect to the right to keep and bear arms, as with other guarantees in the Bill of Rights, was not over whether it was desirable (all agreed that it was)
but over whether it needed to be codified in the Constitution. During the 1788 ratification
debates, the fear that the federal government would disarm the people in order to impose
rule through a standing army or select militia was pervasive in Antifederalist rhetoric.
Federalists responded that because Congress was given no power to abridge the ancient
right of individuals to keep and bear arms, such a force could never oppress the people.
It was understood across the political spectrum that the right helped to secure the ideal
of a citizen militia, which might be necessary to oppose an oppressive military force if the
constitutional order broke down.
It is therefore entirely sensible that the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause
announces the purpose for which the right was codified: to prevent elimination of the militia. The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason
Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for
self-defense and hunting. But the threat that the new Federal Government would destroy
the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason that right—unlike some other
English rights—was codified in a written Constitution.
[P]etitioners’ interpretation does not even achieve the narrower purpose that prompted
codification of the right. If, as they believe, the Second Amendment right is no more than
the right to keep and use weapons as a member of an organized militia, [then] it does not
assure the existence of a “citizens’ militia” as a safeguard against tyranny. For Congress
retains plenary authority to organize the militia, which must include the authority to say
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who will belong to the organized force. *** Thus, if petitioners are correct, the Second
Amendment protects citizens’ right to use a gun
FYI
in an organization from which Congress has
plenary authority to exclude them. It guaranArticle I, § 8, cl. 16 gives Congress the
tees a select militia of the sort the Stuart kings
power “[t]o provide for organizing,
found useful, but not the people’s militia that
arming, and disciplining, the Militia,
was the concern of the founding generation.
and for governing such Part of them
as may be employed in the Service

Our interpretation is confirmed by analoof the United States, reserving to the
gous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions
States respectively, the Appointment
of the Officers, and the Authority of
that preceded and immediately followed adoptraining the Militia according to the
tion of the Second Amendment. Four States
discipline prescribed by Congress.”
adopted analogues to the Federal Second
Is it clear that this provision, especialAmendment in the period between indepenly when viewed in conjunction with
cl. 15, authorizes Congress to deterdence and the ratification of the Bill of Rights.
mine the membership in the various
Two of them—Pennsylvania and Vermont—
state-controlled militias?
clearly adopted individual rights unconnected
to militia service. Pennsylvania’s Declaration
of Rights of 1776 said: “That the people have a
right to bear arms for the defence of themselves, and the state ***.” In 1777, Vermont adopted
the identical provision, except for inconsequential differences in punctuation and capitalization. *** North Carolina also codified a right to bear arms in 1776: “That the people
have a right to bear arms, for the defence of the State ***.” Declaration of Rights § XVII.
This could plausibly be read to support only a right to bear arms in a militia—but that is
a peculiar way to make the point in a constitution that elsewhere repeatedly mentions the
militia explicitly. We [believe] that the most likely reading of [these] pre-Second Amendment state constitutional provisions is that they secured an individual right to bear arms
for defensive purposes. [That] is strong evidence that that is how the founding generation
conceived of the right.
Justice STEVENS places overwhelming reliance upon this Court’s decision in United
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). [According to Justice STEVENS, Miller held that]
the Second Amendment “protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain military
purposes, but that it does not curtail the legislature’s power to regulate the nonmilitary use
and ownership of weapons.” [But] Miller did not hold that and cannot possibly be read to
have held that. The judgment in the case upheld against a Second Amendment challenge
two men’s federal convictions for transporting an unregistered short-barreled shotgun in
interstate commerce, in violation of the National Firearms Act, 48 Stat. 1236. It is entirely
clear that the Court’s basis for saying that the Second Amendment did not apply was [that]
the type of weapon at issue was not eligible for Second Amendment protection: “In the
absence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or use of a [short-barreled
shotgun] at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of
a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right
to keep and bear such an instrument.” 307 U.S. at 178 (emphasis added). “Certainly,”
the Court continued, “it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the
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ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.” Ibid.
[H]ad the Court believed that the Second Amendment protects only those serving in the
militia, it would have been odd to examine the character of the weapon rather than simply
note that the two crooks were not militiamen. *** We therefore read Miller to say only
that the Second Amendment! does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by
law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. ***
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope
of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession! of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or
laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.
*** We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms.
Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” 307 U.S. at 179. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the
historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.”
We turn finally to the law at issue here. [As we have demonstrated,] the inherent
right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right. The handgun ban
amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of “arms” that is overwhelmingly chosen by
American society for that lawful purpose. The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home,
where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute. Under any of the
standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning
from the home “the most preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of
one’s home and family,” 478 F.3d, at 400, would fail constitutional muster. *** Whatever
the reason, handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense
in the home, and a complete prohibition of their use is invalid.
[T]he District’s requirement (as applied to respondent’s handgun) that firearms in the
home be rendered and kept inoperable at all times [makes] it impossible for citizens to use
them for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutional.
Before this Court petitioners have stated that “if the handgun ban is struck down
and respondent registers a handgun, he could obtain a license, assuming he is not otherwise disqualified,” by which they apparently mean if he is not a felon and is not insane.
Respondent conceded at oral argument that he does not “have a problem [with] licensing”
and that the District’s law is permissible so long as it is “not enforced in an arbitrary and
capricious manner.” We therefore assume that petitioners’ issuance of a license will satisfy
respondent’s prayer for relief and do not address the licensing requirement.
Justice BREYER [criticizes] us for declining to establish a level of scrutiny for evaluating Second Amendment restrictions. He proposes, explicitly at least, none of the traditionally expressed levels (strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, rational basis), but rather
a judge-empowering “interest-balancing inquiry” that “asks whether the statute burdens a
protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary
effects upon other important governmental interests.” *** We know of no other enu-
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merated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding
“interest-balancing” approach. The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of
government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on a case-bycase basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon. *** Constitutional rights are
enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them,
whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad.
[The Second Amendment] is the very product of an interest-balancing by the people—
which Justice BREYER would now conduct for them anew. And whatever else it leaves
to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.
We are aware of the problem of handgun violence in this country, and we take seriously the concerns raised by the many amici who believe that prohibition of handgun
ownership is a solution. [But] the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes
certain policy choices off the table. These include the absolute prohibition of handguns
held and used for self-defense in the home. Undoubtedly some think that the Second
Amendment is outmoded in a society where our standing army is the pride of our Nation,
where well-trained police forces provide personal security, and where gun violence is a
serious problem. That is perhaps debatable, but what is not debatable is that it is not the
role of this Court to pronounce the Second Amendment extinct. [Affirmed.]
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice SOUTER, Justice GINSBURG, and Justice
BREYER join, dissenting.
The Second Amendment was adopted to protect the right of the people of each of the
several States to maintain a well-regulated militia. It was a response to concerns raised
during the ratification of the Constitution that the power of Congress to disarm the state
militias and create a national standing army posed an intolerable threat to the sovereignty
of the several States. Neither the text of the Amendment nor the arguments advanced
by its proponents evidenced the slightest interest in limiting any legislature’s authority
to regulate private civilian uses of firearms. Specifically, there is no indication that the
Framers of the Amendment intended to enshrine the common-law right of self-defense in
the Constitution.
In 1934, Congress enacted the National Firearms Act, the first major federal firearms
law. Upholding a conviction under that Act, this Court held that, “[i]n the absence of any
evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than
eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.” Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. The
view of the Amendment we took in Miller—that it protects the right to keep and bear arms
for certain military purposes, but that it does not curtail the Legislature’s power to regulate
the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons—is both the most natural reading of the
Amendment’s text and the interpretation most faithful to the history of its adoption.
*** The preamble to the Second Amendment [is] comparable to provisions in several
State Declarations of Rights that were adopted roughly contemporaneously with the Decla-
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ration of Independence.5 Those state provisions highlight the importance members of the
founding generation attached to the maintenance of state militias; they also underscore the
profound fear shared by many in that era of the dangers posed by standing armies. While
the need for state militias has not been a matter of significant public interest for almost
two centuries, that fact should not obscure the contemporary concerns that animated the
Framers.
The parallels between the Second Amendment and these state declarations, and the
Second Amendment’s omission of any statement of purpose related to the right to use firearms for hunting or personal self-defense, is especially striking in light of the fact that the
Declarations of Rights of Pennsylvania and Vermont did expressly protect such civilian uses
at the time. Article XIII of Pennsylvania’s 1776 Declaration of Rights announced that “the
people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state”; § 43 of the Declaration assured that “the inhabitants of this state shall have the liberty to fowl and hunt in
seasonable times on the lands they hold, and on all other lands therein not inclosed.” And
Article XV of the 1777 Vermont Declaration of Rights guaranteed “[t]hat the people have a
right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State.” The contrast between those
two declarations and the Second Amendment reinforces the clear statement of purpose
announced in the Amendment’s preamble. It confirms that the Framers’ single-minded
focus in crafting the constitutional guarantee “to keep and bear arms” was on military uses
of firearms, which they viewed in the context of service in state militias.
The preamble thus both sets forth the object of the Amendment and informs the
meaning of the remainder of its text. *** The Court today tries to denigrate the importance of this clause of the Amendment by beginning its analysis with the Amendment’s
operative provision and returning to the preamble merely “to ensure that our reading of
the operative clause is consistent with the announced purpose.” That is not how this Court
ordinarily reads such texts, and it is not how the preamble would have been viewed at the
time the Amendment was adopted. *** Without identifying any language in the text that
even mentions civilian uses of firearms, the Court proceeds to “find” its preferred reading
in what is at best an ambiguous text, and then concludes that its reading is not foreclosed
by the preamble. Perhaps the Court’s approach to the text is acceptable advocacy, but it is
surely an unusual approach for judges to follow.
[T]he words “the people” in the Second Amendment refer back to the object announced
in the Amendment’s preamble. They remind us that it is the collective action of individuals having a duty to serve in the militia that the text directly protects and, perhaps more
importantly, that the ultimate purpose of the Amendment was to protect the States’ share
of the divided sovereignty created by the Constitution.
Although the Court’s discussion of [the words “to keep and bear Arms”] treats them
as two “phrases”—as if they read “to keep” and “to bear”—they describe a unitary right: to
5
The Virginia Declaration of Rights ¶ 13 (1776), provided: “That a well-regulated militia, composed of the body
of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free State; that Standing Armies, in
time of peace, should be avoided, as dangerous to liberty; and that, in all cases, the military should be under
strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.” [Maryland, Delaware, and New Hampshire had similar
provisions.]
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possess arms if needed for military purposes and to use them in conjunction with military
activities. *** The term “bear arms” is a familiar idiom; when used unadorned by any
additional words, its meaning is “to serve as a soldier, do military service, fight.” 1 Oxford
English Dictionary 634 (2d ed.1989). It is derived from the Latin arma ferre, which, translated literally, means “to bear [ferre] war equipment [arma].” *** Had the Framers wished
to expand the meaning of the phrase “bear arms” to encompass civilian possession and use,
they could have done so by the addition of phrases such as “for the defense of themselves,”
as was done in the Pennsylvania and Vermont Declarations of Rights. The unmodified use of
“bear arms,” by contrast, refers most naturally to a military purpose, as evidenced by its use
in literally dozens of contemporary texts. *** When, as in this case, there is no [qualifier],
the most natural meaning is the military one; and, in the absence of any qualifier, it is all
the more appropriate to look to the preamble to confirm the natural meaning of the text.
The Amendment’s use of the term “keep” in no way contradicts the military meaning
conveyed by the phrase “bear arms” and the Amendment’s preamble. To the contrary, a
number of state militia laws in effect at the time of the Second Amendment’s drafting used
the term “keep” to describe the requirement that militia members store their arms at their
homes, ready to be used for service when necessary. The Virginia military law, for example,
ordered that “every one of the said officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, shall
constantly keep the aforesaid arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, ready to be produced
whenever called for by his commanding officer.” Act for Regulating and Disciplining the
Militia, 1785 Va. Acts ch. 1, § 3, p. 2. “[K]eep and bear arms” thus perfectly describes the
responsibilities of a framing-era militia member.
[T]he single right that [the clause describes] is both a duty and a right to have arms
available and ready for military service, and to use them for military purposes when necessary. *** When each word in the text is given full effect, the Amendment is most naturally
read to secure to the people a right to use and possess arms in conjunction with service in
a well-regulated militia.
Two themes relevant to our current interpretive task ran through the debates on the
original Constitution. “On the one hand, there was a widespread fear that a national standing Army posed an intolerable threat to individual liberty and to the sovereignty of the
separate States.” Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 340 (1990). On the other
hand, the Framers recognized the dangers inherent in relying on inadequately trained militia members “as the primary means of providing for the common defense,” Perpich, 496
U.S. at 340. *** In order to respond to those twin concerns, a compromise was reached:
Congress would be authorized to raise and support a national Army and Navy, and also to
organize, arm, discipline, and provide for the calling forth of “the Militia.” U.S. Const., Art.
I, § 8, cls. 12-16. The President, at the same time, was empowered as the “Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into the actual Service of the United States.” Art. II, § 2. But, with respect
to the militia, a significant reservation was made to the States: [the] States respectively
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would retain the right to appoint the officers and to train the militia in accordance with the
discipline prescribed by Congress. Art. I, § 8, cl. 16.20
But the original Constitution’s retention of the militia and its creation of divided
authority over that body did not prove sufficient to allay fears about the dangers posed
by a standing army [because] it did not prevent Congress from providing for the militia’s
disarmament. *** This sentiment was echoed at a number of state ratification conventions; indeed, it was one of the primary objections to the original Constitution voiced by
its opponents.
[In response, upon ratifying the Constitution several states proposed amendments to
the document.] The relevant proposals sent by the Virginia Ratifying Convention read as
follows:
“17th, That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated Militia composed
of the body of the people trained to arms is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free State.
That standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the
circumstances and protection of the Community will admit; and that in all cases the military
should be under strict subordination to and be governed by the civil power.”
“19th. That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted, upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead.”

Take Note
Virginia’s proposal—and Madison’s
original draft of the Second Amendment—included a provision to exempt conscientious objectors from
service in the militias. What does
this provision suggest about the
contexts in which the Amendment
protects the right to keep and bear
arms?

North Carolina adopted Virginia’s proposals
and sent them to Congress as its own ***.
New York produced a proposal with nearly
identical language. Notably, each of these
proposals used the phrase “keep and bear
arms” [and] embedded the phrase within a
group of principles that are distinctly military in meaning.

By contrast, New Hampshire’s proposal
[described] the protection involved in more
clearly personal terms[:] “Congress shall never
disarm any Citizen unless such as are or have been in Actual Rebellion.”
[James] Madison, charged with the task of assembling the proposals for amendments
sent by the ratifying States, was the principal draftsman of the Second Amendment. [His]
decision to model the Second Amendment on the distinctly military Virginia proposal is
therefore revealing, since it is clear that he considered and rejected formulations that would
have unambiguously protected civilian uses of firearms. When [his draft proposal] was
debated and modified, it is reasonable to assume that all participants in the drafting process
20

The Court assumes—incorrectly, in my view—that even when a state militia was not called into service, Congress would have had the power to exclude individuals from enlistment in that state militia. That assumption
is not supported by the text of the Militia Clauses of the original Constitution, which confer upon Congress the
power to “organiz[e], ar[m], and disciplin[e], the Militia,” Art. I, § 8, cl. 16, but not the power to say who will be
members of a state militia. It is also flatly inconsistent with the Second Amendment. ***
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were fully aware of the other formulations that would have protected civilian use and possession of weapons and that their choice to craft the Amendment as they did represented a
rejection of those alternative formulations.
Until today, it has been understood that legislatures may regulate the civilian use and
misuse of firearms so long as they do not interfere with the preservation of a well-regulated
militia. The Court’s announcement of a new constitutional right to own and use firearms
for private purposes upsets that settled understanding ***.
Justice BREYER, with whom Justice STEVENS, Justice SOUTER, and Justice GINSBURG join, dissenting.
[T]he protection the [Second] Amendment provides is not absolute. The Amendment
permits government to regulate the interests that it serves. Thus, irrespective of what those
interests are—whether they do or do not include an independent interest in self-defense—
the majority’s view cannot be correct unless it can show that the District’s regulation is
unreasonable or inappropriate in Second Amendment terms. This the majority cannot do.
The majority is wrong when it says that the District’s law is unconstitutional “[u]nder
any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights.”
[It] certainly would not be unconstitutional under, for example, a “rational basis” standard,
which requires a court to uphold regulation so long as it bears a “rational relationship” to
a “legitimate governmental purpose.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). The law at
issue here, which in part seeks to prevent gun-related accidents, at least bears a “rational
relationship” to that “legitimate” life-saving objective.
Respondent proposes that the Court adopt a “strict scrutiny” test, which would require
reviewing with care each gun law to determine whether it is “narrowly tailored to achieve
a compelling governmental interest.” Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (1997). But the
majority implicitly, and appropriately, rejects that suggestion by broadly approving a set
of laws [whose] constitutionality under a strict scrutiny standard would be far from clear.
Indeed, [almost] every gun-control regulation will seek to advance (as the one here does)
a “primary concern of every government—a concern for the safety and indeed the lives of
its citizens.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). *** Thus, any attempt
in theory to apply strict scrutiny to gun regulations will in practice turn into an interestbalancing inquiry, with the interests protected by the Second Amendment on one side and
the governmental public-safety concerns on the other, the only question being whether the
regulation at issue impermissibly burdens the former in the course of advancing the latter.
I would simply adopt such an interest-balancing inquiry explicitly.
***
“[W]here a law significantly implicates competing constitutionally protected interests in
complex ways,” the Court generally asks whether the statute burdens a protected interest
in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other
important governmental interests. See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S.
377, 402 (2000) (BREYER, J., concurring). Any answer would take account both of the
statute’s effects upon the competing interests and the existence of any clearly superior less
restrictive alternative.
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The only dispute regarding [the trigger-lock] provision appears to be whether the Constitution requires an exception that would allow someone to render a firearm operational
when necessary for self-defense ***. The District concedes that such an exception exists.
*** And because I see nothing in the District law that would preclude the existence of a
background common-law self-defense exception, I would avoid the constitutional question
by interpreting the statute to include it. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
No one doubts the constitutional importance of [the] basic objective [of the District’s
ban on handgun possession], saving lives. But there is considerable debate about whether
the [provision] helps to achieve that objective. *** Petitioners, and their amici, have
presented us with [statistics about handgun violence.] *** From 1993 to 1997, there were
180,533 firearm-related deaths in the United States, an average of over 36,000 per year.
*** In over one in every eight firearm-related deaths in 1997, the victim was someone
under the age of 20. *** From 1993 to 1997, 81% of firearm-homicide victims were
killed by handgun. *** Handguns also appear to be a very popular weapon among
criminals. *** Statistics further suggest that urban areas, such as the District, have different experiences with gun-related death, injury, and crime, than do less densely populated
rural areas. A disproportionate amount of violent and property crimes occur in urban
areas, and urban criminals are more likely than other offenders to use a firearm during the
commission of a violent crime.
Respondent and his many amici [disagree] strongly with the District’s predictive judgment that a ban on handguns will help solve the crime and accident problems that those
figures disclose. *** First, they point out that, since the ban took effect [in 1976], violent
crime in the District has increased, not decreased. *** Second, respondent’s amici point to
a statistical analysis that [concludes] that strict gun laws are correlated with more murders,
not fewer. *** Third, they point to evidence indicating that firearm ownership does have a
beneficial self-defense effect. *** Fourth, respondent’s amici argue that laws criminalizing
gun possession are self-defeating, as evidence suggests that they will have the effect only of
restricting law-abiding citizens, but not criminals, from acquiring guns.
[T]he District and its amici [respond] with studies of their own. *** The
upshot is a set of studies and counterstudies that, at most, could leave a judge
uncertain about the proper policy conclusion.
[But] legislators, not judges,
have primary responsibility for drawing policy conclusions from empirical fact.
[D]eference to legislative judgment seems particularly appropriate here, where the judgment has been made by a local legislature, with particular knowledge of local problems
and insight into appropriate local solutions. *** For these reasons, I conclude that the
District’s statute properly seeks to further the sort of life-preserving and public-safety interests that the Court has called “compelling.”
The District’s statute burdens the Amendment’s first and primary objective hardly at
all. [T]here is general agreement among the Members of the Court that the principal (if
not the only) purpose of the Second Amendment is found in the Amendment’s text: the
preservation of a “well regulated Militia.” *** To begin with, the present case has nothing
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to do with actual military service. [And] the District’s law does not seriously affect military
training interests. The law permits residents to engage in activities that will increase their
familiarity with firearms. They may register (and thus possess in their homes) weapons
other than handguns, such as rifles and shotguns. *** And while the District law prevents
citizens from training with handguns within the District, [the] adjacent States do permit the
use of handguns for target practice, and those States are only a brief subway ride away.
[G]iven the costs already associated with gun ownership and firearms training, I cannot
say that a subway ticket and a short subway ride (and storage costs) create more than a
minimal burden.
The District’s law does prevent a resident from keeping a loaded handgun in his home.
And it consequently makes it more difficult for the householder to use the handgun for
self-defense in the home against intruders, such as burglars. [But] there is no clearly
superior, less restrictive alternative to the District’s handgun ban [because] the ban’s very
objective is to reduce significantly the number of handguns in the District ***. [A]ny
measure less restrictive in respect to the use of handguns for self-defense will, to that same
extent, prove less effective in preventing the use of handguns for illicit purposes. If a
resident has a handgun in the home that he can use for self-defense, then he has a handgun
in the home that he can use to commit suicide or engage in acts of domestic violence. ***
[T]he District law is tailored to the life-threatening problems it attempts to address. The
law concerns one class of weapons, handguns, leaving residents free to possess shotguns
and rifles, along with ammunition. The area that falls within its scope is totally urban. ***
The majority derides my approach as “judge-empowering.” I take this criticism seriously, but I do not think it accurate. *** Application of such an approach, of course,
requires judgment, but the very nature of the approach—requiring careful identification of
the relevant interests and evaluating the law’s effect upon them—limits the judge’s choices;
and the method’s necessary transparency lays bare the judge’s reasoning for all to see and
to criticize.
The majority’s methodology is, in my view, substantially less transparent than mine.
*** “Putting all of [the Second Amendment’s] textual elements together,” the majority
says, “we find that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in
case of confrontation.” Then, three pages later, it says that “we do not read the Second
Amendment to permit citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation.” Yet, with one
critical exception, it does not explain which confrontations count. It simply leaves that
question unanswered.
Nor is it at all clear to me how the majority decides which loaded “arms” a homeowner
may keep. The majority says that that Amendment protects those weapons “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.” This definition conveniently excludes
machineguns, but permits handguns, which the majority describes as “the most popular
weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home.” But what sense does this
approach make? According to the majority’s reasoning, if Congress and the States lift
restrictions on the possession and use of machineguns, and people buy machineguns to
protect their homes, the Court will have to reverse course and find that the Second Amend-
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ment does, in fact, protect the individual self-defense-related right to possess a machinegun.
On the majority’s reasoning, if tomorrow someone invents a particularly useful, highly
dangerous self-defense weapon, Congress and the States had better ban it immediately, for
once it becomes popular Congress will no longer possess the constitutional authority to do
so. *** There is no basis for believing that the Framers intended such circular reasoning.
I am similarly puzzled by the majority’s list [of] provisions that in its view would
survive Second Amendment scrutiny. *** Why these? Is it that similar restrictions existed
in the late 18th century? The majority fails to cite any colonial analogues. ***
The argument about method, however, is by far the less important argument surrounding today’s decision. Far more important are the unfortunate consequences that today’s
decision is likely to spawn. Not least of these [is] the fact that the decision threatens to
throw into doubt the constitutionality of gun laws throughout the United States. I can find
no sound legal basis for launching the courts on so formidable and potentially dangerous a
mission. In my view, there simply is no untouchable constitutional right guaranteed by the
Second Amendment to keep loaded handguns in the house in crime-ridden urban areas.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Points for Discussion
a. The Judicial Role and the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty
In holding that the challenged regulations were unconstitutional, the Court noted that
“the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the
table.” Notice that in making this statement, the Court is also asserting its authority both to
determine the meaning of the Constitution and to invalidate democratically enacted laws.
Is it problematic to permit the Court to act in such a counter-majoritarian, and arguably
anti-democratic, fashion? Or is it essential that the Court do so? This question will be
the subtext of all the material that follows, but it will be the particular focus of Chapter 2.

b. Structural and Institutional Arrangements or Individual Rights?
Justice Scalia concluded that the Second Amendment protects an individual right
to keep and bear arms for purposes unrelated to participation in a state militia. Justice
Stevens, by contrast, would have held that the Amendment is principally a structural protection to ensure that Congress cannot disarm the state militias. Which view do you find
more convincing?
Notice that Justice Scalia did not deny the structural aims of the Second Amendment,
and that Justice Stevens did deny that its structural aims advance the interest in liberty.
The first several Parts of this book will focus on the principal structural and institutional
arrangements that the Constitution creates, federalism and separation of powers. As we
will see in detail, the Framers clearly viewed these arrangements as essential to preserving
individual liberty. The remainder of the book will focus on the Constitution’s explicit and
direct protections for individual rights. Does it make sense to treat structural provisions
and rights provisions as separate and discrete features of the constitutional scheme?
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c. Interpretive Methodology: Originalism v. Non-Originalism
In interpreting the Second Amendment, Justice Scalia sought to determine its meaning
at the time of the Framing. He relied on contemporaneous sources, such as eighteenthcentury dictionaries and state constitutional provisions. Justice Breyer focused on the
competing state and individual interests implicated by the challenged regulation. Was
his approach non-originalist? Or did he simply seek to apply the original meaning of
the Second Amendment to modern circumstances? Which approach did you find more
sensible or convincing?

d. Interpretive Methodology: Originalism v. Originalism
Like Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens took an originalist approach to the Second Amendment, but he reached a very different conclusion about the Amendment’s meaning. To the
extent that the two Justices relied on similar materials, whose arguments did you find more
convincing? What does the fact that they relied in part on competing sources say about the
viability of originalism as an approach to interpreting the Constitution?
Did their inquiries have the same objective? Notice that Justice Scalia focused principally on what the language of the Second Amendment likely would have meant at the
time of its ratification. Justice Stevens spent considerable time addressing the Amendment’s
drafting history. Does that mean that Justice Stevens was attempting to discern Madison’s—and the other Framers’—intent in ratifying the Amendment? Is there a difference
between the original “objective meaning” and the original “intent”? Is there a difference in
the evidence that one might use to establish meaning and intent?
Notice also that Justice Scalia read the individual phrases in the Second Amendment
atomistically, asking what each phrase means before assembling those individual meanings
into one, broader meaning. Justice Stevens, by contrast, read the Amendment more holistically, with a particular emphasis on what the preamble suggests about the meaning of what
Justice Scalia referred to as the “operative” clause. Given that many of the Constitution’s
most important provisions are written at a high level of generality and often are ambiguous in their application, what is the role of text in constitutional interpretation? Whose
approach in Heller to the text did you find most convincing?

e. Level of Scrutiny
As the competing opinions suggested, the Court often assesses the constitutionality of
government action by evaluating the governmental interests advanced by the action and
the burden that the action imposes on the constitutional right at issue. For example, the
Court has never interpreted the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
absolutely to prohibit the government from treating different classes of citizens differently.
Some classifications—such as a law providing that only persons over sixteen years of age
are eligible to obtain driver’s licenses—do not seem problematic, and accordingly are subjected only to “rational basis review,” under which they are upheld as long as the classification is reasonably related to some legitimate governmental interest. Other classifications—
such as laws that deny government benefits on the basis of race—are deeply suspect, and
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accordingly are subjected to “strict scrutiny,”
under which they can be upheld only if they are
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling govWe discuss levels of scrutiny in
ernmental interest. Still other classifications—
Chapter 10, and in Chapters 8, 11,
such as those that distinguish on the basis of
12, and 14 we consider their appligender—are subjected to “intermediate scrutication in detail.
ny,” which falls somewhere between rational
basis review and strict scrutiny. The various
levels of scrutiny generally reflect a judgment
that few constitutional prohibitions are absolute, and that some government actions that
burden protected rights nevertheless are defensible.
Make the Connection

What level of scrutiny did the majority apply to the challenged regulations? Did the
majority consider the government’s interest in the challenged regulations? Or did the
majority simply suggest that regulations that would have been prohibited in 1791 are
prohibited today? Does the majority’s suggestion that many regulations of the right to bear
arms would be constitutional shed any light on this question? What level of scrutiny did
Justice Stevens apply?
Justice Breyer explicitly proposed a test under which the challenged regulation’s constitutionality turns on whether the statute “burdens a protected interest in a way or to
an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important
governmental interests.” Is this approach preferable to the majority’s apparent approach
of recognizing categories of absolutely forbidden regulations and of clearly permissible
regulations?

f. Role of Precedent
Before Heller, the Court had decided very few cases that even circumspectly interpreted the Second Amendment. Perhaps the most important was United States v. Miller, 307
U.S. 174 (1939), a brief opinion whose reasoning, as the competing approaches in Heller
show, was far from clear. What is the role of precedent in interpreting the Constitution?
Suppose that the Court in Miller had clearly held that the Second Amendment protects
the right to keep and bear arms only in conjunction with participation in a state militia.
Would the Court in Heller have been bound by that holding if it concluded that the Court
in Miller had failed properly to discern the original meaning of the Amendment? When is it
appropriate for the Court to overrule prior decisions that interpreted the Constitution? In
answering this question, consider what remedies exist when the Court “errs” in interpreting the Constitution.

g. The Constitution and Ambiguity
The issue in Heller was both of great importance and seemingly fundamental. Why do
you think it took the Court over 200 years squarely to resolve that issue? In fact, as we will
see throughout this book, a surprising number of important constitutional questions have
never been addressed by the Court. As you read the materials that follow, consider why,
and whether constitutional ambiguity is a good or bad thing.
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h. Role of the Dissenting Opinions
Why did Justices Breyer and Stevens write such extensive dissenting opinions? Dissenting opinions do not carry any precedential value, as they represent the views of a
minority of Justices. Are dissenting opinions simply an expression of disagreement for
disagreement’s sake? Are they templates for criticism of the Court’s decision? If so, to
what end? Are they in effect intended as the groundwork for a future change of course on
the Court? In this book, we will regularly see dissenting opinions. If nothing else, does
the Court’s frequent inability to achieve unanimity suggest anything about the nature of
constitutional interpretation?

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

P OINT -C OUNTERPOINT

Does Heller represent originalism’s triumph or its failure?
POINT: GREGORY E. MAGGS
“Originalism” is a doctrine saying that judges should interpret the Constitution according to its original meaning. Proponents of originalism disagree on some points, such as
whether judges should focus on the original intent of the Framers, the original understanding of the ratifiers, or the original objective meaning of the Constitution’s text. But they
all agree that none of these meanings change over time and that judges should not allow
current policy considerations to affect their interpretation of the Constitution.
One common objection to originalism is that it does not produce certain results. The
argument supporting this objection is that the text of the Constitution and the relevant
historical materials are often too sparse or inconclusive to produce definitive answers
to current constitutional issues. This deficiency may prevent judges from determining
answers to important constitutional questions. Worse, it may allow judges to decide cases
according to their own political preferences and then cover up what they are doing with
make-weight arguments resting on vague historical documents.
At first glance, the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct.
2783 (2008), might appear to support this objection to originalism. Justice Scalia’s opinion
for the Court and Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion both claim to use originalist methodology, but they reach different conclusions. This result may suggest to some that originalism cannot answer the question of what the Second Amendment means. In addition, the
Court’s conservatives concluded that the gun control law at issue was unconstitutional,
while the Court’s liberals concluded that it was not. Because conservative politicians tend
to oppose gun control, and liberal politicians tend to favor it, this division of the Justices
might suggest that politics determined the Justices’ positions.
But further reflection should reveal that Heller does not represent a failure of originalism. Any method of constitutional interpretation may produce differing conclusions. But
originalism appears to be generally more determinate than other interpretative methods.
Most of the cases in this book contain both majority and dissenting opinions, yet in very
few of these cases did both sides attempt to use originalist methodology. Heller is an
example, as is U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), but not many others come
to mind. Has any other method of constitutional interpretation produced comparable
certainty?
As for policy preferences, a closer look casts doubt on suspicions that either the majority or the dissent in Heller was just voting for the outcome that it favored as a matter of
policy. The District of Columbia statute was among the most extreme gun control laws in
the nation. Even without knowing what the individual Justices actually think about gun
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control, it is difficult to believe that all of the members of the dissent, who generally favor
personal rights, would want laws that effectively ban all handgun ownership. The majority
meanwhile went out of its way to make clear, in dicta, that many kinds of gun regulations
are still constitutional. Again, it is hard to imagine that all of the Justices in the majority
would favor every possible regulation. Instead, Heller appears to represent a good faith
effort to determine what the Second Amendment originally meant, and is thus a triumph
of originalism.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
COUNTERPOINT: PETER J. SMITH
Originalism’s proponents contend that it is the only legitimate approach to constitutional interpretation because (they say) it is the only approach that accords to the Constitution an objectively identifiable fixed meaning and, in so doing, prevents the Justices from
imposing their personal policy preferences under the guise of constitutional interpretation.
Yet the dueling opinions in Heller demonstrate why originalism fails to live up to its promise.
The 27 words of the Second Amendment provoked over 100 pages of interpretive
analysis, and led two incredibly intelligent, historically well-versed, and widely respected
Justices to diametrically different interpretations. And this should not be surprising. Most
constitutional provisions are written at a very high level of generality—such as “Equal
Protection” or “Due Process”—that give few hints about their “original” meaning as applied
to concrete circumstances. And even those—such as the Second Amendment—that seem
to speak at a higher level of specificity often are susceptible to multiple (and irreconcilable)
interpretations. (The language of the Amendment, with its prefatory and operative clauses,
is particularly obscure.) Add to these textual ambiguities the historical ambiguities that
originalism invites—Would a “reasonable person” in 1791 have understood the first half
of the Second Amendment to qualify the second half? Even assuming we can find enough
evidence of such understanding, what if reasonable people in 1791 (like reasonable people
today) disagreed about the meaning of the Amendment?—and originalism rarely produces
meaning any more determinate than any other approach to constitutional interpretation.
If originalism is unlikely (at least in difficult cases, which, after all, are the only ones
that end up seeing the light of day in a courtroom) to produce determinate meaning, then
originalists’ claims about how it constrains judges begin to fall apart. A judge seeking the
original meaning of the Second Amendment can focus either on early militia provisions in
state Declarations of Rights (as did Justice Stevens) or instead on the even-earlier English
Bill of Rights or the writings of Blackstone (as did Justice Scalia); on contemporaneous dictionary definitions (as did Justice Scalia) or instead on contemporaneous state militia laws
that used similar words (as did Justice Stevens). A judge can read early state constitutional
provisions referring explicitly to the right to bear arms for self-defense either to confirm
(as did Justice Scalia) or to refute (as did Justice Stevens) the view that the Second Amendment similarly protects such a right. And although there is no obvious reason to doubt
the sincerity with which the Justices approached the question, one cannot ignore that the
Justices widely viewed as the most conservative sided with the view preferred by political
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conservatives and that the more liberal Justices sided with the view preferred by political
liberals. Originalism, it seems, is not nearly as constraining as its proponents claim.
Legal scholars have long debated the original meaning of the Second Amendment. But
historians recognize that any such question is not susceptible to one authoritative answer;
the Constitution, after all, was ratified by collective decision-making (in each state, no less),
which reflected a dizzying array of (often dueling) intentions, expectations, hopes, and
fears. One can debate whether the majority or the dissent had the better of the arguments.
But it is time that we stopped pretending that this particular approach to constitutional
interpretation is any better than others at establishing rules for judges to do what they
must: to exercise judgment.
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